

Accountability in the Home and Community Care Sector in Ontario

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
Focus

- Organizational behaviour in relation to accountability
 - Expect that organizational characteristics play a role in how organizations respond to accountability demands
- Examining how home and community support service (HCSS) agencies respond to LHIN Multi-Service Accountability Agreements and CCAC contracts

Purpose: understanding how and why organizations respond to accountability can impact on development and implementation of accountability frameworks

- Shift policy to benefit both accountor and accountee

What factors play a role and how do organizations respond



Based on Oliver's (1991). Organizational responsiveness framework

Research Questions

- *RQ1*: What accountability frameworks are currently in place and how do the characteristics of these frameworks vary?
- *RQ2*: What is the array of realized organizational responses to accountability requirements?
- *RQ3*: How do responses vary as a function of organizational factors?
- *RQ4*: What are the potential impacts of accountability frameworks on home care service delivery?

Method: Document Analysis

- Online searches for relevant accountability documents: May 2009-February 2012
- Documents coded using Nvivo 7 software (sub-sample double coded for validity)
- Examines documents in terms of:
 - “to whom”
 - “for what”
 - “at what cost”



Accountability to LHINs and CCACs

| For what | | To whom: LHINs and CCACs |
|---------------------|--|---|
| | Purpose (Brinkerhoff, 2003 & 2004) | Mainly: Financial and performance To a lesser extent: Political and procedural |
| | Responsibilities (Bergsteiner and Avery, 2009) | Bi-directional – more responsibility for HCSS CCAC contracts are clearer than LHIN MSAAs. |
| | Citizen engagement (Abelson and Gauvin, 2004) | No citizen engagement beyond client satisfaction and complaints processes |
| At what cost | Answerability (Brinkerhoff, 2003) | Reporting: Financial and performance Monitoring and oversight: meetings, performance improvement plans, ongoing communication |
| | Sanctions (Brinkerhoff, 2003) | Reduction of funding and/or contract volume Termination Other: fines, removal of personnel, information disclosure Remedy: organizations are given the opportunity to remedy problems prior to experiencing sanctions. |

Method: Survey

- Unit of analysis: organizations delivering home and community care services for seniors in one urban and rural region in Ontario
- Sampling frame: HCSS agencies in urban and rural region in Ontario & OCSA members
- N = 115. Response rate: 18.82% (115 of 611)
 - Higher proportion of respondents delivering home care services as compared to non-respondents. CCAC and LHIN service deliver separated in analysis, so higher representation acceptable.
- Examines 4 of 13 propositions in relation to RQ3.

Proposition 1: Larger organizations will be more likely to comply with accountability requirements

Response to LHIN

Response to CCAC contract

| Table 5-6. Logistic regression analysis of 48* organizations compliance response to LHIN MSAAs in relation to their size. | | | | | | | Table 5-7. Logistic regression analysis of 49* organizations compliance response to CCAC contracts in relation to their size. | | | | | | |
|---|---------|------------|-----------------|----|--------|-----------------------------|---|---------|------------|-----------------|----|--------|-----------------------------|
| Predictor | β | SE β | Wald's χ^2 | df | p | e β & CI (odds ratio) | Predictor | β | SE β | Wald's χ^2 | df | p | e β & CI (odds ratio) |
| Intercept | -1.317 | 0.9654 | 1.858 | 1 | 0.1720 | N/A | Intercept | -3.5187 | 1.5081 | 5.4434 | 1 | 0.0196 | N/A |
| Size | 0.8525 | 0.4561 | 3.4938 | 1 | 0.0616 | 2.346 (0.959; 5.734) | Size | 0.8948 | 0.6134 | 2.1281 | 1 | 0.1446 | 2.447 (0.735; 8.141) |
| Test | | | χ^2 | df | p | | Test | | | χ^2 | df | p | |
| Likelihood ratio test | | | 3.8017 | 1 | 0.0512 | | Likelihood ratio test | | | 2.3407 | 1 | 0.1260 | |
| Score test | | | 3.7116 | 1 | 0.0540 | | Score test | | | 2.2335 | 1 | 0.1351 | |
| Wald test | | | 3.4938 | 1 | 0.0616 | | Wald test | | | 2.1281 | 1 | 0.1446 | |
| Goodness-of-fit test | | | | | | | Goodness-of-fit test | | | | | | |
| Hosmer & Lemeshow** | | | 1.9975 | 1 | 0.1576 | | Hosmer & Lemeshow** | | | 7.4524 | 1 | 0.0063 | |
| Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL MSAACOMP (event = '1') = SIZE/LACKFIT;] Somers' Dxy: 0.309. Gamma: 0.475. Kendall's Tau- α : 0.151. c: 0.654. All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision. N/A = not applicable. | | | | | | | Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL CCACCOMP (event = '1') = SIZE/LACKFIT;] Somers' Dxy: 0.319. Gamma: 0.428. Kendall's Tau- α : 0.098. c: 0.660. All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision. N/A = not applicable. | | | | | | |
| *This number is less than the total 56 organizations identified in Table 5-2 as some of these organizations had missing data on their size. | | | | | | | *This number is less than the total 60 organizations identified in Table 5-2 as some of these organizations had missing data on their size. | | | | | | |
| ** More than 25% of the cells had an expected frequency of less than 5, which suggests that H-L may not be an appropriate test. | | | | | | | ** More than 25% of the cells had an expected frequency of less than 5, which suggests that H-L may not be an appropriate test. | | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Moderate support for the proposition With every unit increase in size an organization is 2.346 times (95% CI, 0.959, 5.734) more likely to comply with LHIN MSAAs. | | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak support for the proposition May indicate larger home care organizations have more "power" in which they can push back on external demands | | | | | | |

Proposition 2a: Organizations are more likely to comply with accountability requirements from stakeholders upon whom they are highly dependent for funding

Response to LHIN

Response to CCAC contract

| Table 5-8. Logistic regression analysis of 53* organizations compliance response to LHIN MSAAs in relation to the percent of funding received from LHINs. | | | | | | | Table 5-9. Logistic regression analysis of 47* organizations compliance response to CCAC contracts in relation to the percent funding received from CCACs. | | | | | | |
|---|---------|------------|-----------------|----|--------|-----------------------------|---|---------|------------|-----------------|----|--------|-----------------------------|
| Predictor | β | SE β | Wald's χ^2 | df | p | e β & CI (odds ratio) | Predictor | β | SE β | Wald's χ^2 | df | p | e β & CI (odds ratio) |
| Intercept | -0.0294 | 0.5139 | 0.0033 | 1 | 0.9544 | N/A | Intercept | -2.3901 | 0.5651 | 17.8883 | 1 | <.0001 | N/A |
| Percent LHIN funding | 0.00556 | 0.00819 | 0.4600 | 1 | 0.4600 | 1.006 (0.990; 1.022) | Percent CCAC funding | 0.0349 | 0.0114 | 9.4549 | 1 | 0.0021 | 1.036 (1.013; 1.059) |
| Test | | | χ^2 | df | p | | Test | | | χ^2 | df | p | |
| Likelihood ratio test | | | 0.4615 | 1 | 0.4965 | | Likelihood ratio test | | | 11.0185 | 1 | 0.0009 | |
| Score test | | | 0.624 | 1 | 0.4965 | | Score test | | | 14.4463 | 1 | 0.0001 | |
| Wald test | | | 0.4600 | 1 | 0.4976 | | Wald test | | | 9.4549 | 1 | 0.0021 | |
| Goodness-of-fit test | | | | | | | Goodness-of-fit test | | | | | | |
| Hosmer & Lemeshow** | | | 10.6225 | 9 | 0.3025 | | Hosmer & Lemeshow** | | | 1.0731 | 1 | 0.3003 | |
| Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL MSAACOMP (event = '1') = S_LHIN/LACKFIT;] Somers' Dxy: 0.104. Gamma: 0.107. Kendall's Tau- α : 0.052. c: 0.552. All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision. N/A = not applicable. | | | | | | | Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL CCACCOMP (event = '1') = S_CCAC/LACKFIT;] Somers' Dxy: 0.609. Gamma: 0.772. Kendall's Tau- α : 0.176. c: 0.804. All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision. N/A = not applicable. | | | | | | |
| *This number is less than the total 56 organizations identified in Table 5-2 as some of these organizations had missing data on their size. | | | | | | | *This number is less than the total 60 organizations identified in Table 5-2 as some of these organizations had missing data on their size. | | | | | | |
| ** More than 25% of the cells had an expected frequency of less than 5, which suggests that H-L may not be an appropriate test. | | | | | | | ** More than 25% of the cells had an expected frequency of less than 5, which suggests that H-L may not be an appropriate test. | | | | | | |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposition not supported 43.75% organizations receiving 81-100% funding from LHIN do not plan on applying in the future Compliance may impact on other relationships (Calabrese, 2011) or possibly come along with too much overhead costs | | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong support for the proposition Each additional percent funding from CCAC makes organization 1.086 times more likely to comply Organizations complying with CCAC contracts tend to get majority of funding from CCAC | | | | | | |

The influence of number of stakeholders.
 In relation to proposition 2b: Organizations' that have multiple dependencies on different stakeholders who have differing accountability requirements are less likely to have the same response to all requirements.

Response to LHIN

Response to CCAC contract

| Table 5-10. Logistic regression analysis of 63* organizations compliance response to LHIN MSA in relation to the number of stakeholder and accreditation relationships held. | | | | | | Table 5-12. Logistic regression analysis of 59* organizations compliance response to CCAC contract in relation to the number of stakeholder and accreditation relationships held. | | | | | | | |
|--|---------|------------|-----------------|----|--------|--|-----------------------|---------|------------|-----------------|----|--------|--------------------------------|
| Predictor | β | SE β | Wald's χ^2 | df | p | e $^{\beta}$ & CI (odds ratio) | Predictor | β | SE β | Wald's χ^2 | df | p | e $^{\beta}$ & CI (odds ratio) |
| Intercept | -0.6323 | 0.4950 | 1.6320 | 1 | 0.2014 | N/A | Intercept | -3.3888 | 0.8725 | 15.0868 | 1 | 0.0001 | N/A |
| Total networks | 0.1610 | 0.1526 | 1.1135 | 1 | 0.2913 | 1.175 (0.871; 1.584) | Total networks | -0.0778 | 0.2085 | 0.1391 | 1 | 0.7092 | 0.925 (0.615; 1.392) |
| Total associations | 0.2690 | 0.1945 | 1.9127 | 1 | 0.1667 | 1.309 (0.894; 1.916) | Total associations | 0.3938 | 0.2266 | 3.0191 | 1 | 0.0823 | 1.483 (0.951; 2.312) |
| Total accreditors | 0.1007 | 0.3983 | 0.0640 | 1 | 0.8003 | 1.106 (0.507; 2.414) | Total accreditors | 1.4115 | 0.6812 | 4.2927 | 1 | 0.0383 | 4.102 (1.079; 15.591) |
| Test | | | | | | | Test | | | | | | |
| Likelihood ratio test | | | 5.6142 | 3 | 0.1320 | | Likelihood ratio test | | | 10.4479 | 3 | 0.0151 | |
| Score test | | | 5.2090 | 3 | 0.1571 | | Score test | | | 11.6463 | 3 | 0.0087 | |
| Wald test | | | 4.7873 | 3 | 0.1880 | | Wald test | | | 7.0739 | 3 | 0.0696 | |
| Goodness-of-fit test | | | | | | | Goodness-of-fit test | | | | | | |
| Hosmer & Lemeshow** | | | 7.6001 | 8 | 0.4735 | | Hosmer & Lemeshow** | | | 5.2073 | 7 | 0.6347 | |
| Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL MSAACOMP (event = '1') = S_TOTNET_S_TOTASC TOTACR /LACKFIT;] Somers' Dxy: 0.348. Gamma: 0.357. Kendall's Tau- α : 0.173. c: 0.674. All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision. N/A = not applicable. | | | | | | Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL CCACCOMP (event = '1') = S_TOTNET_S_TOTASC TOTACR /LACKFIT;] Somers' Dxy: 0.580. Gamma: 0.597. Kendall's Tau- α : 0.166. c: 0.790. All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision. N/A = not applicable. | | | | | | | |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of stakeholders not found to influence compliance (or compromise) responses Demands of stakeholders may not differ significantly | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Number of stakeholders have some influence over compliance Association membership: organizations are 1.483 times more likely to comply Accreditation: organizations are 4.102 times more likely to comply | | | | | | | |

Proposition 5a: Organizations with better access to resources will be more likely to comply with accountability requirements

Response to LHIN

Response to CCAC contract

| Table 5-13. Logistic regression analysis of 54* organizations compliance response to LHIN MSSAs in relation to the organizations size and human resource distribution. | | | | | | Table 5-14. Logistic regression analysis of 47* organizations compliance response to CCAC contracts in relation to the organizations size, human resource distribution, and status. | | | | | | | |
|--|---------|------------|-----------------|----|--------|--|-----------------------|---------|------------|-----------------|----|--------|--------------------------------|
| Predictor | β | SE β | Wald's χ^2 | df | p | e $^{\beta}$ & CI (odds ratio) | Predictor | β | SE β | Wald's χ^2 | df | p | e $^{\beta}$ & CI (odds ratio) |
| Intercept | -0.8801 | 0.9068 | 0.9420 | 1 | 0.3318 | N/A | Intercept | -3.3669 | 1.5035 | 5.0147 | 1 | 0.0251 | N/A |
| Size | 0.4035 | 0.4348 | 0.8612 | 1 | 0.3534 | 1.497 (0.638; 3.510) | Size | 0.8992 | 0.6271 | 2.0562 | 1 | 0.1516 | 2.458 (0.719; 8.400) |
| % Full-time staff | 0.0295 | 0.0193 | 2.3344 | 1 | 0.1265 | 1.030 (0.992; 1.070) | % Full-time staff | -0.0113 | 0.0190 | 0.3552 | 1 | 0.5512 | 0.989 (0.953; 1.026) |
| Status | | | | | | | Status | 1.7681 | 1.6654 | 1.1272 | 1 | 0.2884 | 5.860 (0.224; 153.265) |
| Test | | | | | | | Test | | | | | | |
| Likelihood ratio test | | | 5.1581 | 2 | 0.0758 | | Likelihood ratio test | | | 3.3234 | 3 | 0.3444 | |
| Score test | | | 4.5341 | 2 | 0.1036 | | Score test | | | 3.4311 | 3 | 0.3298 | |
| Wald test | | | 3.9792 | 2 | 0.1367 | | Wald test | | | 3.0689 | 3 | 0.3811 | |
| Goodness-of-fit test | | | | | | | Goodness-of-fit test | | | | | | |
| Hosmer & Lemeshow** | | | 11.5817 | 9 | 0.2379 | | Hosmer & Lemeshow** | | | 6.6910 | 7 | 0.4618 | |
| Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL MSSACOMP (event = '1') = SIZE FTEPERC VPERC /LACKFIT;] Somers' Dxy: 0.294. Gamma: 0.297. Kendall's Tau- α : 0.145. c: 0.647. All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision. N/A = not applicable. | | | | | | Note: SAS programming code: [PROC LOGISTIC; MODEL CCACCOMP (event = '1') = SIZE FTEPERC VPERC S_FPNFP /LACKFIT;] Somers' Dxy: 0.345. Gamma: 0.349. Kendall's Tau- α : 0.109. c: 0.673. All statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical precision. N/A = not applicable. | | | | | | | |
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| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Weak support for the proposition Market-related resource scarcity found to influence internal organizational behaviour rather than response to external demands (McKay, 2001). | | | | | | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Proposition not supported Well-resourced organizations have been found to avoid requirements (Carlin and Finch, 2010). Rather that inability it may be unwillingness to meet demands | | | | | | | |

Method: Interviews

- Purposive, “criterion” sampling
- 4 accountors from LHIN and CCAC in urban and rural regions
 - 1 urban LHIN, 1 rural LHIN, 1 urban CCAC, 1 rural CCAC
- Accountees: HCSS agencies in urban and rural regions
 - 14 organizations
 - 16 interviews (with 20 individuals)
- Coded using Nvivo 10. Sub-set double coded for validation.
- Data provides information to answer RQ2
- Will examine remaining 9 propositions in relation to RQ3.

| Org. | Size | Status | Urban/ rural | Contract/ MSAA | Response |
|--------|-------|--------|-------------------|----------------------------------|---|
| CSA 1 | Small | NFP | Rural | Held MSAA | Returned funding |
| CSA 2 | Med | NFP | Urban | 5 LHIN MSAA | Meet requirements but trouble with reporting – HR |
| CSA 3 | Small | NFP | Rural | 1 LHIN MSAA | Trouble meeting targets |
| CSA 4 | Large | NFP | Across Ontario | 9 LHIN MSAA 13 CCAC contracts | Trouble meeting targets. Policy changes, more “business” focused |
| CSA 5 | Med | NFP | Rural | 2 CCAC contracts | Meets requirements. Previously lost contract due to missed targets (HR) |
| CSA 6 | Small | NFP | Rural | 1 LHIN MSAA | Meets requirements. Greater awareness of demands. |
| CSA 7 | Large | FP | Can&US | Many CCAC cons | Mostly meets requirements – some missed targets. |
| CSA 8 | Large | NFP | Across Ontario | 16 CCAC contracts, 8 CCACs | Some contracts meet other miss targets. Substantial sub-contracting |
| CSA 9 | Med | NFP | Rural | 1 LHIN MSAA | Meets requirements |
| CSA 10 | Small | NFP | Rural | 1 LHIN MSAA | Trouble meeting targets – HR. Reduced time to spend on patients. |
| CSA 11 | Large | NFP | Canada | Many CCAC conts. and MSAA | Missed targets resulted in reduction and loss of contracts. Impacts on business model |
| CSA 12 | Small | NFP | Urban | 1 LHIN MSAA | Trouble meeting targets. Adapted policies |
| CSA 13 | Med | NFP | Urban | 1 CCAC contract 1 MSAA | Trouble meeting targets |
| CSA 14 | Med | NFP | Urban | 1 MSAA | Meet targets. Merged with other CSA. HR strain. |

Emerging themes from interviews

- Rural organizations face many more challenges in meeting requirements than their urban counterparts
- Accountability demands place significant burden on human resources, sometimes to the detriment of client care
 - Particularly problematic given LHIN cap on % funding that can be used on administration
- Organizations are changing business models and the way they deliver services in order to meet requirements
- Non-compliance is most often due to missed performance targets (often related to staffing challenges)
- Unintended consequences:
 - Negative: Erosion of trust between accountant and accountee; reduced time with clients
 - Positive: Increased focus on quality by staff, management and boards

Preliminary conclusions

RQ1: HCSS face multiple accountabilities. CCACs and LHINs impose significant financial and performance accountability demands mainly in the form of reporting requirements.

RQ2: Organizations are complying, avoiding, negotiating and compromising. Organizations are also changing policies, business models, and service delivery to meet demands.

RQ3: Organizational size, dependency, number of stakeholders, and location (rural vs. urban) may influence response to demands.

RQ4: Accountability demands may be taking away from client care due to reporting demands on frontline staff

Next steps

- Complete interview analysis
- Mix-methods: combine document, survey and interview findings into final analysis
- Anticipated end-date: Summer 2013

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